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The Use of Discretionary Authority by
International Organizations in their
Relations with International
Civil Servants
BRUNO MICHEL DE VUYST*
The purpose of this article is to review both the exercise of discre-
tionary authority by international organizations with respect to treatment
of their staff, and the reactions by some international administrative
tribunals to such exercise of discretionary authority as perceived through
the judgments of such tribunals, particularly those of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal (UNAT), the International Labor Organization
Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), and the World Bank Administrative
Tribunal (WBAT).
I. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It falls beyond the scope of this article to deal with the legal-theoreti-
cal problems of what constitutes "international administrative law" (i.e.,
the internal law of an international organization, including the law gov-
erning the relationship between an international organization and its
staff) as part of and as a wholly separate branch of public international
law. It is sufficient to state for the purposes of this article that the domes-
tic law of international organizations, sometimes called "infra-interna-
tional law," is recognized in doctrine as an autonomous legal branch of
public international law.'
This international administrative law is, however, not a well-defined
nor all-encompassing body of law. C.W. Jenks stated:
[A]s international administrative law developes further, it will be
necessary to resolve the series of dilemmas already brought into focus
in the preliminary stages of its development. They will not necessarily
be resolved in a clear-cut and uniform manner.
At its present stage of development international administrative
*Counsel, The World Bank, Legal Department. Lic. R., 1975 (U.I.A.); LL.M., Columbia
University, 1976; C.R.B. Fellow of the Belgian American Educational Foundation 1975-1976.
The opinions set forth in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
World Bank.
1. Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 343; A. VERDROSS, ON THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493
(1949); Bastid, Have the United Nations Administrative Tribunals Contributed to the De-
velopment of International Law?, in W. FRIEDMAN, TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING So-
ctETr 307 (1972); S. BASDEVANT (BASTID), Les fonctionnaires internationaux, thesis 68-69,
283 (1931). See also, Oral Statements to the International Court of Justice (June 11, 1954).
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law is primarily a law governing the international public service and
the administration of international public funds; as it developes fur-
ther it may well be increasingly concerned with the exercise of admin-
istrative powers directly affecting third-party interests.
If these varied dilemmas are to be successfully resolved, the fur-
ther development of international administrative law must be nour-
ished by a wide and deep understanding of administrative law gener-
ally, and disciplined by a full and instinctive awareness of the
practical realities of international administration.'
As K.S. Carlston put it, analysis of international administrative law
must start with an analysis of the employing organizations themselves.
Pointing to the goals outlined for this autonomous branch of law, Carl-
ston stated:
[I]nternational administrative law, as all law, is directed to ensur-
ing the preservation and fullest expression of an idea in action. When
that idea is expressed in the complex and permanent system of action
which we call an organization, law is concerned with preserving the
integrity of the organization as an expression of its essential idea. It is
concerned with preserving those ways of action which are necessary to
enable the fullest expression of the idea which is at the heart of the
organization. Its control of conduct flows from the necessity of main-
taining the integrity of those patterns of action to which the system
must adhere, if it is to maintain itself and be vigorous. International
administrative law is, accordingly, more than an individual necessity
in the functioning of the secretariat as a system of authority. It is an
organizational necessity .... Ultimately, the rules of international
administrative law represent a compromise between the values of the
organization and the values of the individual participant in the day-
to-day functioning of the secretariat. The organizational values of
flexibility and discretion in the exercise of authority often clash with
individual values of stability and security.
International administrative law discharges its functions when it
harmonizes these conflicting values upon a viable basis, assuring to
the administration a reasonable degree of authority and flexibility for
the accomplishment of administrative goals and to individuals a rea-
sonable degree of protection against abuse of authority ....
II. THE SOURCES OF LAW
The sources of the relationship between international organizations
and their staff are to be found primarily in legal instruments constituting
or emanating from international organizations: international administra-
tive law is primarily a law made by and for international organizations.
2. C.W. JENKS, THE PROPER LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 128-29 (1962).
3. Carlston, International Administrative Law: A Venture in Legal Theory, J. PuB. L.
334, 337 (1959).
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Its first decision, de Merode v. The World Bank,' gave the WBAT
the opportunity to survey the sources of the legal relationship between
the World Bank and its staff. It found as possible sources of such rela-
tionship contractual documents (letters offering and accepting appoint-
ment), 5 provisions in the constituent instruments of the organizations,'
and staff regulations or, in their absence, instruments such as manuals,
circulars, notes or statements that include undertakings which form part
of the conditions of employment of international organizations' staffs.7
The WBAT also stated that, in certain circumstances, the organiza-
tion's regular practice may become part of the conditions of employment,8
and further:
[O]bviously, the organization would be discouraged from taking mea-
sures favorable to its employees on an ad hoc basis if each time it did
so it had to take the risk of initiating a practice which might become
legally binding upon it. The integration of practice into the conditions
of employment must therefore be limited to that of which there is
evidence that it is followed by the organization in the conviction that
it reflects a legal obligation, as was recognized by the International
Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on Judgments of the Admin-
istrative Tribunal of the ILO.'
The WBAT also found that "[tihe specific circumstances of each case
may also have some bearing on the legal relationship between the Bank
and the individual member of the staff, particularly the actual conditions
in which the appointment has been made.'"
The International Court of Justice had stated in its 1956 Advisory
Opinion that "it is necessary to consider these contracts not only by ref-
erence to their letter but also in relation to the actual conditions in which
they are entered into and the place which they occupy in the Organiza-
tion."1  The UNAT acknowledged the above-mentioned opinion, and de-
4. World Bank Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter cited as WBAT or World Bank
Admin. Trib.) Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. (1981), Decisions 1-4, at 1.
5. Id. at 9, para. 17.
6. Id. at 9-10, paras. 18-19.
7. Id. at 11, para. 22. See Haghou v. International Centre for Advanced Technical and
Vocational Training, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 421 (Dec. 11, 1980), for the im-
pact of an information. See Powell v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
237 (Feb. 13, 1979), for the impact of a circulaire. See Smargiassi-Steinman v. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 319
(Nov. 21, 1977), for the notion of an "informative" v. a "normative" text. See De Bonel v.
Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 145 (Apr. 18, 1971), for the notion of
"aiqe-m~moire." See also, Advisory Opinion on Application for Review of Judgement No.
273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 359, at 518 (Schwebel, S.,
dissenting, with regard to the status of personnel action forms).
8. de Merode v. The World Bank, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib.
Rep. 12, para. 23.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 12, para. 24.
11. Judgements of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organisation
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clared that "[t]he terms and conditions of employment of a staff member
of the United Nations may be expressed or implied and may be gathered
from correspondence and surrounding facts and circumstances."12 The
WBAT confirmed further that "certain general principles of law, the ap-
plicability of which has in fact been acknowledged by the Bank in its
written and oral pleadings,"' s formed another source of the rights and
duties of staff.
It may appear necessary, however, to make some reservation with re-
gard to the application of principles of law. While Alain Plantey", lists
general principles of law as a source of international administrative law,
he confirms that such principles do not prevail over a clear and written
provision, citing Lacher5 as support. One may conclude, following
Plantey, that if general principles of law are a source of international ad-
ministrative law, they essentially serve as a guide to the interpretation or
application of express provisions, possibly completing them where they
are not fully developed.16 Thus, it may be that, in the words of
Akehurst,17 "[T]he relevance of traditional international law [in deter-
mining legal relations between organizations and their staffs] is startlingly
limited."' 8
The WBAT has treated with caution the question of whether the
conditions of employment of staff include the rights and duties defined in
relation to other international organizations by other administrative
tribunals, i.e., whether there exists a corpus juris shared by all interna-
tional officials. It should be recalled that, in Chadsey,9 in Irani0 and in
Teixeira,"' the respective administrative tribunals spoke of "general prin-
upon complaints made against the U.N.E.S.C.O., 1956 I.C.J. 76, (Advisory Opinion of Oct.
23, 1956), cited in de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12,
para. 23.
12. Bhattacharyya v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 142 (Apr.
14, 1971), and Sikand v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 95 (Sept. 29,
1965).
13. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 25. See
also Zihler v. European Organization for Nuclear Research, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 435 (Dec. 11, 1980), and Angelopoulos, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 71 (Apr.
6, 1979).
14. A. PLANTEY, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE, an updated English version of
DROIT ETr PRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE (1977).15. Lather, O.E.C.D. Appals Comm. Decsio;o qn53 (May 2. 1975).
16. A. PLANTEY, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE INTERNATIONALE 74
(1977); see Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs Internationaux et Leur Jurisprudence, in
92 II RECUEIL DES Couss 369 (1957); Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de l'O.I.T., in ETUDES
Er DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 33, 56 (1969).
17. M.B. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1967).
18. Id. at 98.
19. Chadsey v. Universal Postal Union, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 122 (Oct.
15, 1968).
20. Irani v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 150 (Oct. 6, 1971).
21. Teixeira v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 230 (Oct. 14,
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ciples of international civil service law." In Irani,"' the UNAT spoke also
of a "body of rules applicable to the international civil service."" As part
of Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal,24 Judge Ammoun, in a dissenting opinion,
spoke of a "common administrative law" in the course of formation and
"tending towards unity and becoming universal.""
The WBAT, while reaffirming its character as an international tribu-
nal2 s and thereby reaffirming the dictum and implied pronouncements of
the International Court of Justice in its 195627 and 197328 opinions, con-
sidered that it was its task "to decide internal disputes between the Bank
and its staff within the organized legal system of the World Bank, and
that it must apply the internal law of the Bank as the law governing the
conditions of employment."2"
The WBAT stated further:
[T]he Tribunal does not overlook the fact that each international or-
ganization has its own constituent instrument; its own membership;
its own institutional structure; its own functions; its own measure of
legal personality; its own personnel policy; and that the differences
between one organization and another are so obvious that the notion
of a common law of international organization must be subject to nu-
merous and sometimes significant qualifications. But the fact that
these differences exist does not exclude the possibility that similar
conditions may affect the solution of comparable problems. While the
various international administrative tribunals do not consider them-
selves bound by each other's decisions and have worked out a some-
times divergent jurisprudence adapted to each organization, it is
equally true that on certain points the solutions reached are not sig-
nificantly different. It even happens that the judgments of one tribu-
nal may refer to the jurisprudence of another. Some of these judg-
ments even go so far as to speak of general principles of international
civil service law or of a body of rules applicable to the international
civil service. Whether these similar features amount to a true corpus
juris is not a matter on which it is necessary for the Tribunal to ex-
press a view. The Tribunal is free to take note of solutions worked out
in sufficiently comparable conditions by other administrative tribu-
nals, particulary those of the United Nations family. In this way the
Tribunal may take account both of the diversity of international orga-
1977).
22. Note 20 supra.
23. Id.
24. Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 249 (Advisory Opinion of July 12, 1973).
25. Id. See also Fernandez-Lopez v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 254 (Apr. 23, 1980).
26. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 27.
27. 1956 I.C.J. at 97.
28. 1973 I.C.J. at 212.
29. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12, para. 27.
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nizations and the special character of the Bank without neglecting the
tendency towards a certain rapprochement.30
III. DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY
Discretionary authority is a term often used but seldom defined in
the context of the relations between international organizations and their
staffs. The discretionary authority of an international organization may
be stated plainly to mean its freedom to act.8 As Akehurst points out,
the use of the expressions "discretionary powers" or "discretionary au-
thority" and the resulting definitions thereof are in fact, however, over-
simplifications.3 2 He states:
[T]he Administration may well be bound to do a particular act,
but be free to choose the time or method; conversely, it may be free to
act or not to act, but be obliged to follow a certain procedure if it does
decide to act. It is therefore more accurate to speak, not of discretion-
ary powers, but of discretionary elements in the exercise of powers."3
The holding in de Merode ' allowed the WBAT to state its views
comprehensively in regard to such discretionary "elements" in the exer-
cise of the organization's powers while reflecting on the staff's conditions
of employment. The WBAT stated that "[clertain elements [in their con-
ditions of employment] are fundamental and essential in the balance of
rights and duties of the staff member; they are not open to any change
without the consent of the staff member affected. Others are less funda-
mental and less essential in this balance."3 These elements may be uni-
laterally changed in the exercise of the organizations' powers, subject to
limits and conditions, but. even so, "discretionary power is not absolute
power."36
The organizations' power to amend nonessential terms may be exer-
cised subject to certain limitations:
[F]irst, no retroactive effect may be given to any amendments
adopted by the Bank. The Bank cannot deprive staff members of ac-
crued rights for services already rendered. This well-established prin-
ciple has been applied in many judgments of other international ad-
ministrative tribunals. The principle of non-retroactivity is not the
30. Id. at 13, para. 28; See Zihler, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. 435, and Angelo-
poulous, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 71.
31. See de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. at 14, para.
30; Hoefnagels v. World Health Organization, I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 25 (July 12, 1957);
Plissard v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12 (Sept. 3, 1954); Mauch v. Secre-
tary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 54 (June 2, 1954).
32. M.B. AKEHURST, supra note 17, at 115.
33. Id.
34. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin Trib. Rep. 12 at 19.
35. Id. para 42.
36. Id.
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only limitation upon the power to amend the non-fundamental ele-
ments of the conditions of employment. The Bank would abuse its
discretion if it were to adopt such changes for reasons alien to the
proper functioning of the organization and to its duty to ensure that it
has a staff possessing "the highest standards of efficiency and of tech-
nical competence." Changes must be based on a proper consideration
of relevant facts. They must be reasonably related to the objective
which they are intended to achieve. They must be made in good faith
and must not be prompted by improper motives. They must not dis-
criminate in an unjustifiable manner between individuals or groups
within the staff. Amendments must be made in a reasonable manner
seeking to avoid excessive and unnecessary harm to the staff. In this
respect, the care with which a reform has been studied and the condi-
tions attached to a change are to be taken into account by the
Tribunal.3
7
What is an essential right is difficult to establish. As the WBAT
stated in de Merode:38
The Tribunal recognizes that it is not possible to describe in ab-
stract terms the line between essential and non-essential elements any
more than it is in abstract terms possible to discern what is reasonable
and unreasonable, fair and unfair, equitable and inequitable. Each
distinction turns upon the circumstances of the particular case, and
ultimately upon the possibility of recourse to impartial determination.
However, this difficulty has not prevented distinctions of this kind
from playing a central role in the application of the law generally and
the Tribunal sees no reason for rejecting the relevance of such a dis-
tinction in the internal law of the Bank. Sometimes it will be the prin-
ciple itself of a condition of employment which possesses an essential
and fundamental character while its implementation will possess a
less fundamental and less essential character. In other cases, one or
another element in the legal status of a staff member will belong en-
tirely-both principle and implementation-to one or another of
these categories. In some cases the distinction will rest upon a quanti-
tative criterion; in others, it will rest on qualitative considerations.
Sometimes it is the inclusion of a specific and well-defined undertak-
ing in the letters of appointment and acceptance that may endow such
an undertaking with the quality of being essential.39
Also, with regard to non-essential rights, WBAT stated in de Mer-
ode"0 that "the Tribunal must satisfy itself in each case that the Bank's
power to change the non-fundamental elements in the conditions of em-
ployment of its employees has not been exercised either retroactively or
in an arbitrary or otherwise improper manner. 41
37. Id. paras. 46-47.
38. Id. para. 43.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. para. 48.
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Paying due respect to the reservation expressed above, what is and is
not within the discretionary authority of an international organization in
its relations with its staff is a matter in which a review of the case law of
international administrative tribunals may give some guidance. Also, if a
matter is within the discretionary authority of an international organiza-
tion, a review of the case law of international administrative tribunals
may clarify what should be considered "arbitrary," "abusive" or "im-
proper" uses of such authority.
The wide range of executive discretion may be divided into a number
of general areas when studying the case law of international administra-
tive tribunals. A first area concerns the determination of professional
qualifications, often coupled with or accompanied by a decision to termi-
nate, extend or review an appointment.
In Yanez,' 2 appellant contested the non-renewal of his fixed-term ap-
pointment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
Appellant requested, inter alia, the examination of his right to expect the
renewal of his contract, and the rescission of the contested decision which
he alleged constituted a disciplinary measure and was vitiated by proce-
dural defects. The ICAO contended that the appellants' contract carried
no expectancy of renewal, such terms being clearly stated in Field Service
Staff Rule 2.3(c) to which complainant was subject; that there had been
no termination in that complainant's contract expired in accordance with
its terms; that the allegations of procedural defects were unfounded in
view of the fact that appellant suffered no damage from the first confi-
dential report; and that the provisions on which appellant relied were ir-
relevant. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal.43 It affirmed that appellant
was subject to Field Service Staff Rule 2.3(c)" and declared that the deci-
sion not to renew a contract on its expiry. was within the Secretary-Gen-
eral's discretion.45 The Tribunal also rejected the other claims of com-
plainant and, in particular, declined the complainant's request that it
examine the presumed or possible motives for the non-renewal of the con-
tract by stating that, as it had decided in previous cases:
[T]he Tribunal cannot, in principle, undertake an examination of the
reasons or grounds for a decision not to renew a contract where the
administrative decision in question does not affect any right or legiti-
mate expectation, as in the case of a staff member whose appointment
ends simply because its period has expired. 4"
The Tribunal in Vanhove 4' held that "[the determination of stand-
42. Yanez v. International Civil Aviation Organization, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 112 (Oct. 25, 1967).
43. Id. at 276.
44. Id. at 274.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Vanhove v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 14 (Jan. 26,
1952).
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ards of qualification is a matter of administration and not one for the
Tribunal."4 International administrative tribunals have been unequivocal
in upholding this principle. It was reaffirmed in Levinson,4" Mohan,"
Wang1 and Brown." In Brown," UNAT held that "the Secretary-Gen-
eral is entitled to set standards for recruitment to permanent appoint-
ments as appear appropriate to him."" In Levinson" and Mohan," the
UNAT held to this principle despite the fact that the appellants' immedi-
ate supervisors considered them fully qualified for the posts they occu-
pied. Their supervisor's assessment did not limit the right or responsibil-
ity of the Secretary-General to set standards, nor did it establish
improper motivation for the termination of the appointment as the re-
sponsibility was the Secretary-General's, not the immediate supervisor's.
The Tribunal held in Zimmet,87 that findings as to the quality of the
work of the appellant and his habits of industry and productivity were
matters "properly left to the sound discretion of the Secretary-General."
ILOAT confirmed the same principle in Sherif," stating that "the
professional values of which he was subject" were "neither within the ju-
risdiction nor the possibility of this Court.""
It was held in Waghorn" that "the Director-General had the right to
terminate the complainant's employment on the grounds of unsatisfac-
tory services, the evaluation of such services falling within his discretion-
ary powers, subject to review in the event of an abuse of power."6 In
Baracco2 the Tribunal upheld a termination of a probationary appoint-
ment on medical grounds as within the discretion of the organization."
48. Id. at 41.
49. Levinson v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 (Dec. 11,
1953).
50. Mohan v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 45 (Dec. 11, 1953).
51. Wang v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 48 (Dec. 11, 1953).
52. Brown v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 50 (Dec. 11, 1953).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Levinson, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 at 214.
56. Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 45 at 223.
57. Zimmet v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 52 (May 29,
1954).
58. Sherif v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 29 (July 13, 1957).
59. Id. See Campanella v. UNESCO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 34 (Sept. 23,
1958).
60. Waghorn v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 28 (July 12, 1957).
61. Id.
62. Baracco v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 192.
63. For termination of probationary appointment on grounds of unsatisfactory perform-
ance, see Wakley v. WHO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 53 (Oct. 6, 1961); Mange v.
WHO, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 8 (May 16, 1960); Mclntire v. Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13 (Sept. 3,
1953). For discretionary authority with respect to an evaluation of performance in the pro-
cess of deciding on the confirmation of a probationary appointment, see Buranavanichkit v.
The World Bank, WBAT Decision No. 7, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. (May 25, 1982).
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In Corredoira-Filippini,6 4 the Tribunal threw out a complaint against
a decision not to renew a fixed-term appointment despite a recommenda-
tion to renew by the Appeals Committee, stating that "there was no rea-
son for the Director-General, who has sole responsibility for the smooth
running of the Organization, not to exercise his authority" 5 in respect of
the non-renewal of Appellant's appointment.6 In Chadsey7 and Ballo,es
the Tribunal quashed decisions not to renew a contract, in one case be-
cause of the contract's illegal basis, and in the other, because of an incom-
plete assessment of appellant's performance. The Tribunal in Chadsey
restated its view, however, that such decision-making authority lay prop-
erly within the U.P.U.'s Management Committee's discretion.6 9
Roy"0 concerned a staff member of ICAO who held a permanent ap-
pointment and was discharged for misconduct. Appellant requested the
Tribunal to order implementation of the recommendations of the Advi-
sory Joint Appeals Board and the rescission of the discharge decision.
This Board recommended that the appellant be granted the indemnity,
payable in case of termination of a permanent appointment by mutual
agreement between the Secretary-General and the staff member. The Tri-
bunal rejected the appellant's first request, on the ground that it had no
competence over matters such as the payment of termination indemni-
ties. The indemnities require certain actions that are within the discre-
tionary powers of the Secretary-General, and therefore it could not give
binding force to the Board's recommendation. Furthermore, the Tribunal,
without deciding the merits of the case, ordered the case remanded on the
ground that respondent had not met the requirements of due process
prior to taking the decision to discharge the appellant. It ordered the cor-
rection of the procedural defect and awarded appellant compensation for
the loss caused by the procedural delay and costs.
A request for the rescission of the decision to dismiss appellant was
64. Corredoira-Filippini v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 312 (June 6, 1977).
65. Id.
66. See Reitan v. International Labor Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 316 (Nov. 21, 1977); Magassouba v. International Computing Center (WHO), Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 324 (Nov. 21, 1977).
67. Chadsey, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 122.
68. Ballo v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 191 (May 15, 1972).
69. See Anciaux v. European Southern Observatory, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 266 (Apr. 12, 1976); De Sanctis v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 251 (May 5, 1975); Stracey v. Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 136 (May 6,
1974); Goyal v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Judge-
ments U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 191 (May 15, 1972). For EEC cases, see Kergall v. E.E.C., II
E.E.C. COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS, 23-24 (1955-1956), and Mirossevitch v. E.E.C., II E.E.C.
COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS 387 (1955-1956).
70. Roy v. I.C.A.O., Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123 (Oct. 31, 1968).
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rejected by the Tribunal in Reid71 on the ground that the Secretary-Gen-
eral enjoyed wide discretion under the Staff Regulations in respect of dis-
ciplinary matters, particularly in view of the fact that here the contested
decision was properly taken and did not suffer from lack of due process.
The appellant was a former security guard at the United Nations who
was separated from service following findings of misconduct. He appealed
the Secretary-General's rejection of the recommendations of the Joint
Disciplinary Committee and of the Joint Appeals Board, alleging that he
was wrongfully dismissed and claiming either reinstatement or compensa-
tion for damages. The Tribunal, however, rejected the complainant's
pleas on the above grounds. Additionally, it found that the Secretary-
General, in deciding not to accept the Committee's recommendations to
merely censure the complainant, "was acting within the scope of his au-
thority, 7 2 inasmuch as such recommendations were merely advisory in
character. As to the recommendations of the Joint Appeals Board to treat
the separation as an agreed termination and to pay an enhanced termina-
tion indemnity to the appellant, the Tribunal held that such matters in-
volved the exercise of discretion vested in the Secretary-General. As it
had decided in Roy, 7 3 the Tribunal also held here that "in the absence of
legal obligations on the part of the Respondent, it has no competence to




In Plissard&s and Gausi (No. 1),7 the Tribunal recognized the discre-
tionary nature of the power of the Director-General to retain an official in
the service beyond normal retirement age. The facts were similar in both
cases: appellants had reached the normal retirement age and had ap-
pealed to the Tribunal to rescind the decisions of the Director-General
refusing an extension of their appointments. The Tribunal upheld the de-
cision in the first case. 77 It found that the Staff Regulations conferred
unlimited discretionary powers on the Director-General to decide on ex-
ceptions to the general rule on retirement age. Furthermore, the Tribunal
found that the decision not to grant an extension had properly been
taken, and consequently, declared the Director-General's decision "final
and not subject in law to any rule which has not been observed. 7 8 In the
second case, however, the Tribunal reached the opposite conclusion on
71. Reid v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 (Apr. 12, 1976).
72. Id. at 410.
73. Roy, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123.
74. Id. See also X, O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 2 (Apr. 25, 1950): "Consider-
ant qu'il n'appartient pas A la commission, juge de droit, de comparer la valeur profession-
nelle et les qualifications techniques des agents de l'Organisation, ainsi que leurs titres
respectifs a Atre affecths ou maintenus dans un service"; similar language is used in Bessoles,
O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 30 (May 13, 1959), at 56; see Angelopoulous,
O.E.C.D. Appeals Comm. Decision No. 49 (Dec. 17, 1974), at 63.
75. Plissard, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12.
76. Gausi v. Int'l Centre for Advanced Technical and Vocational Training (Gausi No.
1), Judgements I.L.O. Adr'in. Trib. No. 223.
77. Plissard, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 12.
78. Id.
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the latter point. 9 It found that the decision not to renew the complain-
ant's appointment had no basis in substance, that the decision had not
properly been taken and that it was tainted.80
Appellant in Molina"1 complained of the non-confirmation of a per-
manent appointment. Concerning the discretionary power not to confirm,
ILOAT stated:
[Tihe Tribunal emphasizes again the exceptional character of the Di-
rector-General's discretion in refusing to confirm probationary service.
Perhaps the most important object of probation is to enable the Di-
rector-General to ascertain whether the probationer fits in with the
Organization; this is something that can never be completely ascer-
tained from his record or from interviews. Yet the work of a group
may be ruined by incompatibility and the Director-General has to
bear the heavy burden of seeing that it is not.
In this case he has concluded in effect that there is sufficient evi-
dence to show that the complainant was incompatible. If he had based
this solely upon the complainant's inability to achieve an harmonious
working relationship with the first-level supervisor, there is ample evi-
dence to show that in this respect the complainant would not have
been exceptional. But there is other evidence of incompatibility. In a
case in which the Director-General has personally and after the exer-
cise of great care concluded that there is sufficient evidence to show
that the complainant has 'not satisfactorily adjusted to WHO service'
it is virtually impossible for the Tribunal to intervene."2
Additional areas of executive discretion concerned the grading,
reclassification and regrouping of staff. The Tribunal in Cardena8s held
that a complaint relying in substance on an individual appreciation of the
relative merits of one official against another must fail, the Tribunal not
having jurisdiction in the absence of evidence showing that the complaint
was the subject of arbitrary or improper treatment amounting to an ille-
gality under the regulations. The determination of the salary scale of the
International Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.) and the classification of
officials within those scales were deemed "matters falling within the sov-
ereign authority"'" of the Plenipotentiary Conference, the Administrative
Council and the Secretary-General:
[I]n the absence of any evidence that a particular decision taken in
virtue of such authority was arbitrary or in bad faith, the Tribunal
c ,t ...... a competent to scrutinize the cossifi-
cation of officials and thus to assume a hierarchical authority over the
79. Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.
80. Id.
81. In re Molina, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 440 (Dec. 11, 1980).
82. Id. at 9, 10.
83. Cardena v. International Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.), Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 39 (Sept. 29, 1958).
84. Id.
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organization and its executive head."'
In Opinion Given by the Members of the Administrative Tribunal of
the International Labour Organisation on the Questions put to Them
Jointly in Accordance with the Decision of the Governing Body of the
International Labour Office Taken at its 205th Session,6 ILOAT stated
that "it would no doubt be an abuse of his discretion for the Director-
General to direct a new survey merely for the purpose of getting rid of a
salary scale which he disliked. 8 7 But ILOAT found that "the Director-
General, having acted properly within his discretion in accepting the rec-
ommendations of the ICSC, would not infringe the acquired rights of ex-
isting officials by imposing the new scales.""M
The WBAT in de Merode89 reviewed the World Bank management's
powers to change the existing tax reimbursement policy for those staff
members whose salaries are subject to national taxation (mostly U.S. staff
members). The WBAT confirmed that the Bank did not "have the power
unilaterally to abolish the tax reimbursement system or to repay a lesser
amount than the the taxes which each of the Applicants is required to
pay.. ." as this was deemed to be an essential element in the conditions
of employment.90 It did note, however, that the method of computation of
the tax reimbursement could be changed by the Bank at its discretion,
albeit that such discretion should not be abused.91 The WBAT also de-
cided that, while the World Bank is obliged to carry out periodic reviews
of salaries, taking into account various relevant factors, it "is under no
duty to adjust salaries automatically to increases in the cost of living [as
applicants had argued] and it retains a measure of discretion in this re-
gard.""2 It then found that the World Bank did not fail to observe the
contracts of employment or terms of appointment of applicants by exer-
cising its discretion with regard to general salary increases. 9
Champoury," Coffinet," Ducret," Fath7 and Snape,"s in which the
85. Id.
86. I.L.O. Admin. Trib. Opinion (May 16, 1978).
87. Id.
88. Id. See Bernard and Coffino v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 380
(June 4, 1979); Hatt and Leuba v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 382 (June 4,
1979); See also Maupain, Une nouvelle dimension jurisprudentielle du droit de La fonction
publique dans la famille des Nations Unies, in R.G.D.I.P. 794 (1980).
89. de Merode, WBAT Decision No. 1, World Bank Admin. Trib. Rep. 12 at 40.
90. Id. at 40, para. 82.
91. Id. at 41, pares. 82-83. See also paras. 47 & 88.
92. Id. at 56, para. 112.
93. Id. at 57, para. 113.
94. Champoury v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 76 (Aug. 17,
1959).
95. Coffinet v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 77 (Aug. 17,
1959).
96. Ducret v. Secretar.-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 78 (Aug. 17, 1959).
97. Fath v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 79 (Aug. 17, 1959).
98. Snape v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 80 (Aug. 17, 1959).
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U.N. Administrative Tribunal upheld claims by U.N. proofreaders at Ge-
neva to be reclassified on the same basis as proofreaders in New York,
appear at first to represent an exception to the general principle that the
classification of staff is a matter within the discretion of the Secretary-
General. But it is an apparent exception only and can be explained by the
terms and confusion over the scope of the applicable General Assembly
decisions. Appellants in these cases were employed as proofreaders at the
P-1 level in the Geneva office of the United Nations and appealed the
Secretary-General's decision not to reclassify them. The Secretary-Gen-
eral had agreed with appellants and had submitted a budget to the U.N.
General Assembly, including funds specifically allocated to pay for the
upgrading of six positions in Geneva. The U.N. General Assembly struck
out such funds when approving the budget and the Secretary-General in-
formed appellants that their request must be denied. Appellants went
before the U.N. Joint Appeals Board, which recommended that the Secre-
tary-General upgrade the appellants pursuant to their request. The Sec-
retary-General rejected such advice, saying he had to conform to the deci-
sion of the General Assembly. Before the Tribunal appellants argued that
equal pay for equal work mandated regrading, pointing to various staff
regulations adopted by the General Assembly.
Appellants also argued that, as the International Court of Justice had
held in the 1954 Effects of Awards of Compensation case,9' the power to
approve the budget does not mean that the General Assembly had the
power to avoid honoring obligations already incurred by the organization.
Instead, the power of the General Assembly must be limited by obliga-
tions under the Staff Regulations, promulgated by the General Assembly,
to adopt post-classification rules which call for equal pay for equal work.
The Secretary-General responded by arguing that equal pay did not re-
quire absolute equality and that the Tribunal was not competent to over-
rule the exercise by the General Assembly of its budgetary functions,
which constitute a legislative act under the U.N. Charter, and its func-
tions to classify posts.
The Secretary-General further argued that the Tribunal was a judi-
cial body of limited jurisdiction and would be exceeding its powers if it
ruled on the validity of an action of the General Assembly dealing with
the budget or the Staff Regulations.
The response to this by the Tribunal was stated as follows:
[T]he Tribunal notes that under its Statute it is competent to hear
and pass judgment upon applications alleging non-observance of the
Staff Regulations. The application alleges non-observance of Staff
Regulation 2.1. Consequently the Tribunal is competent to interpret
and apply Regulation 2.1. Under this Regulation, the General Assem-
bly expressly reserved for itself, in respect to general principles affect-
99. Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 242 (Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954).
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ing classification, certain powers which, to the extent to which they
are exercised, limit the power of the Secretary-General. In interpret-
ing this provision with reference to a particular decision, the Tribunal
must consider whether or not, in the case in question, the Assembly
exercised its power under Staff Regulation 2.1 and, consequently,
whether or not the Secretary-General's freedom of action was reduced
by such exercise. As in the case of the other provisions of the Staff
Regulations, the Tribunal, in applying this provision, is competent to
say whether Respondent's interpretation is legally valid.100
It then held that the General Assembly's action did not modify gen-
erally the application of the Staff Regulations on classification of posts
and that, the action still being in effect, the Secretary-General would be
required to comply with it. Since the Tribunal felt the Regulation re-
quired regrading in this case, it quashed the decision of the Secretary-
General refusing to regrade the appellants. The Tribunal indicated that
the Secretary-General had misinterpreted such Regulation and that
regrading would not be inconsistent with the actions of the General As-
sembly in rejecting a specific budget item, since that action did not in
itself change the underlying principle on post classification adopted by
the same General Assembly. The decision, in an awkward way, stresses
the authority which the Secretary-General might-must-exercise to
avoid arbitrariness.10 ' Walther,'0 2 Boyle,'0 3 Joshi " Dadivas and Cal-
lanta,0 5  and Routier'0 6 have amply confirmed the principles of
nonreviewability of (re-)grading decisions, which are subject to review by
an international administrative tribunal only when flawed.
In Sharma107 ILOAT held "that there can be non-acquired rights as
regards the relative position of an official within the administrative hier-
archy, nor any right to promotion, the latter being within the exclusive
authority of the official's supervisors.' 0 1
The discretionary authority of the organization in this field has been
100. Id.
101. Compare Pouros v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 138 (Nov. 3, 1969), in which the non-exercise of a discretionary power by the
Director General of UNESCO was treated by the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal as the con-
sequence of an error of law and the challenged decision was quashed.
102. Walther v. United International Bureau for Protection of Industrial Property,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 106 (May 9, 1967).
103. Boyle v. I.T.U., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 178 (May 3, 1971).
104. Joshi v. Universal Postal Union, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 208 (May 14,
1973).
105. Dadivas and Collanta v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 153 (May 26, 1970).
106. Routier v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 252
(May 5, 1975).
107. Sharma v. International Labour Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No.
30 (July 14, 1957).
108. Id.
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upheld in Lamadie'0 9 and Andary,110 in which the Tribunal reasserted
the primacy of the organization's discretionary powers as to promotion,
and added that the organization may amend its criteria for promotion
(e.g., by adding criteria) even if such action would "deprive any particular
category of officials of their benefits" ''1 or even when such action is con-
trary to the recommendations of an advisory body, such as a Careers
Committee. " '
In Tranter (No. 1),3 ILOAT held that the comparative evaluation
of the services of two individuals on the occasion of a reduction of staff is
a matter within the discretion of the organization. The Tranter (No. 1) "14
Judgment has been reaffirmed in Hermann,' 5 despite its quashing of a
UNESCO decision for failure to follow certain procedural requirements.
The right of an organization to regroup its forces to meet new situations
has also been recognized by the European Economic Community Court of
Justice in the Kergall decision116 and in Aubert," 7 in which the Tribunal
held that "the organization has the right. . . to effect reduction of posts
. . .to abolish either individual posts or categories of posts and [to] sub-
stitute others more suitable for the carrying out of necessary duties in the
changed circumstances. '"1 8 Howrani'1 9 expressed the same necessity to
preserve, in general, the organization's flexibility and adaptability in the
face of new demands. 120
A third area of executive discretion concerns what may be termed
matters of staff organization and personnel procedure. The Tribunal in
Hoefnagels212 held that the Director-General of WHO "enjoys discretion-
ary powers in respect of the transfer of staff members to posts other than
109. Lamadie v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No.
262 (Oct. 27, 1975).
110. Andary v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 263
(Oct. 27, 1975).
111. Id.
112. Id. See also Brisson v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 303 (June 6, 1977); Karkens v. International Patent Institute, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 304 (June 6, 1977); Ledrut and Biggio v. International Patent Institute,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 300 (June 6, 1977).
113. Tranter (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 14 (Sept. 3, 1954).
114. Id.
115. Hermann v. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
dudgm UUClTI.fLC.J.. Adl1. T. . .. 1 .- a. 17 10A
116. Goyal, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 191. See also Borgeaux v. E.E.C., II
E.E.C. COURT OF JUSTiCE DECISIONS 457 (1955-1956).
117. Aubert v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 2 (June 30, 1950).
118. Id. at 5. See also Chuinard v. European Organization for Nuclear Research, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 139 (Nov. 3, 1969), and Glatz-Cavin v. United Nations Edu-
cational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 127
(Oct. 15, 1968).
119. Howrani v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 4 (Aug. 25,
1951).
120. Id. at para. 47.
121. Hoefnagels, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 25.
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those to which they are initially assigned. 12 ' Reynolds1 2 3 held that the
Director-General of the FAO may assign an official to any one of the duty
stations of the organization and that, while a refusal of the complainant
to comply with a decision to transfer her from Washington to Rome did
not constitute a voluntary resignation or provide grounds for her sum-
mary dismissal for serious misconduct, it did nonetheless constitute a
breach of her statutory obligations. It was then open to the organization
to initiate proceedings for the termination of her appointment. This prin-
ciple was subsequently reaffirmed. 2 4
In Campanella12 5 the Tribunal held that it had no authority to su-
pervise or to state the terms of a certificate containing any evaluation
whatsoever of the services of a person whose engagement had been termi-
nated. Appellant contested, inter alia, UNESCO which set forth the man-
ner in which the Director-General proposed to appraise the quality of ap-
pellant's past service with UNESCO. Appellant had been employed under
a fixed-term contract to serve in a mission to Guatemala, and had been
separated from the service following a request by Guatemalan officials to
terminate appellant's mission. The appraisal which the Director-General
would have given would have taken into account the unfavorable opinions
of these officials, to which appellant objected. The Tribunal dismissed the
complaint for failure to file in due time. The Tribunal observed, however,
that even had the complaint been receivable, it had "no authority to su-
pervise or to state the terms of a certificate containing any evaluation
whatsoever of the services of the person concerned, this being a preroga-
tive of the Director-General."I2 6
The Tribunal held in Coutsis, 2 7 that it was not competent "to ex-
press views on the accuracy of the diagnosis or conclusions of the medical
profession.'" 28 Appellant had not been renewed in a fixed-term appoint-
ment on medical grounds. He had contracted dysentery during an assign-
ment in Haiti, whereupon, following a number of medical examinations,
the Medical Director of the United Nations Health Services recom-
mended that appellant not be re-employed in tropical areas. Appellant
alleged, inter alia, that the Secretary-General of the United Nations
122. Id.
123. Reynolds, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 138.
124. See Bidali v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 166 (Nov. 17, 1970); Frank v. International Labor Organiza-
tion, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 154 (May 26, 1970); Silow v. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 151 (May 26,
1970); Douwes v. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Judgements
I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 129 (Mar. 17, 1969); Tarrab v. International Labor Organization,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 132 (Mar. 17, 1969); Nowakowska v. World Meterologi-
cal Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 115 (Oct. 18, 1967).
125. Campanella, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 34.
126. Id.
127. Coutsis v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 69 (Aug. 22,
1957).
128. Id. at 418.
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based his decision contrary to an opinion issued by appellant's private
physician. The Secretary-General asserted, inter alia, that his decision
could not be deemed to be arbitrary merely because he accepted the
Medical Director's recommendation, and refused a review of his decision
as being inconsistent with his authority, under Staff Regulation 4.6, to
establish and apply medical standards. The Tribunal found that the deci-
sion under review had been taken without prejudice or improper motiva-
tion, and refused to rescind the Secretary-General's decision. The Tribu-
nal rejected appellant's claims and held, inter alia, that, in view of the
absence of any express provision for a reference in cases of conflict of
medical opinions, it must be considered "the normal course for the Secre-
tary-General under Staff Regulation 4.6 to follow the Medical Director's
recommendations as to which staff members should be deemed fit for ap-
pointment."1 " The Tribunal concluded that it "cannot proceed to a re-
view on medical grounds of the Secretary-General's decision based upon
the Medical Director's recommendation merely because of the applicant's
contention that the Medical Director's findings were erroneous and con-
flicting with the opinions of other doctors."' 0
The Tribunal in Roux"' held that annual leave was subject to the
requirements of the service. Appellant, in this case, went on sick leave on
the strength of a medical certificate after his request for annual leave was
refused due to the requirements of the service. A complaint was filed af-
ter appellant's annual review. The Tribunal observed that the actions
taken by appellant's supervisor had not resulted in injury to appel-
lant-in effect appellant's annual leave remained intact and an increment
was even granted. It held that the decision had been taken in accordance
with the Staff Regulations and, furthermore, that these actions were
within the discretionary power of the supervisor and did not constitute an
abuse of power as alleged by appellant. It held, finally, that the discretion
exercised by the supervisor was not subject to review by the Tribunal.
The appellant in Bang-Jensen1 3 2 filed a protest against the proceed-
ings of the Joint Disciplinary Committee which had led to a recommenda-
tion for his dismissal. Appellant had been charged with grave misconduct
because of his behavior as a member of the Secretariat for the Special
Committee for Hungary, and, in particular, because of his failure to com-
ply with instructions to return to the Secretariat confidential papers
which were in his possession. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim
of lack of due pro.... -ce. and fllalitv ript.ing, also, intp.r alia, the appel-
lant's contention that inadequate security arrangements existed in the
UN for the safeguarding of confidential papers. The Tribunal held that a
statement by the Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the UN
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Roux v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 36 (Sept. 29, 1958).
132. Bang-Jensen v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 74 (Dec. 5,
1958).
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that adequate security arrangements and procedures for the preservation
of secret and confidential papers existed within the Secretariat of the UN
"must be taken as conclusive of the matter."
In the De PojidaefP3 3 case the Tribunal held it inappropriate "to in-
tervene in what are administrative matters as to the method and manner
of presentation of periodic reports," indicating that it "would at any time
be cautious about passing any comment which discouraged the develop-
ment of the best possible annual reporting system."" 4 The Tribunal in
Roux " 5 held that an evaluation by a supervisor contained in an annual
report is made within the exercise of discretion and constituted only an
opinion prior to a decision by the Director-General. It held that there
could be no recourse to the Tribunal in relation to such an evaluation.
Failure to follow prescribed procedure may be grounds for judicial
relief, but whether a prescribed administrative procedure is appropriate
appears not (unless the procedure appears to be tainted) to be a matter
for consideration by international administrative tribunals. For example,
in the De Pojidaeff8 6 case the Tribunal stated that it was not part of its
functions to indicate views on alleged weaknesses in internal administra-
tive procedures and that if a recommendation of the Appeals Board re-
vealed weaknesses in the machinery of the Secretariat it was for the Sec-
retary-General to deal with the matter. In Levinson,1 3 7 Bergh,'"
Mohan,13 9 White,"1 0 Carter,"1 and Carruthers,1 4 2 the Tribunal rejected
allegations that there had been an absence of due process before a Selec-
tion Committee entrusted with the selection of members of the staff to be
offered permanent appointments; it noted that "the Committee was an
internal administrative body, established by and functioning in the way
approved by the Secretary-General in order to tender him advice"14 and
that "it is not for the Tribunal to express an opinion on internal adminis-
trative practices adopted by the Secretary-General."1 4 4 However, in
133. DePojidaeff v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17 (Dec. 16,
1952).
134. Id. at 64.
135. Roux, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 36.
136. DePojidaeff, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17 at 63.
137. Levinson, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43.
138. Bergh v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 44 (Dec. 11, 1953).
139. Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 50.
140. White v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46 (Dec. 11, 1953).
141. Carter v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 47 (Dec. 11,
1953).
142. Carruthers v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 49 (Dec. 11,
1953).
143. Bergh, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 44 at 210; Carruthers, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 49 at 242; Carter, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 47 at 232; Levinson,
Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 43 at 213; Mohan, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
50 at 223; White, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46 at 228.
144. Carruthers, U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 49 at 242.
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Newton,1 4 the Tribunal stated that it "is not precluded from making ob-
servations if it considers that legislative acts of the Organization appear
contrary to the general principle of nondiscrimination. . . and such ob-
servations can be considered by the competent authorities as
recommendations."1 4 6
IV. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
DISCRETION
International administrative tribunals are-as are international orga-
nizations themselves-a relatively new phenomenon. The League of Na-
tions first attempted to deal with staff grievances by granting officials
who had been appointed for five years or more a right to appeal their
dismissal to the Council.14 7 When confronted with the first appeal under
this system, however, the Council referred the case-Monod 1 48-to an ad
hoc Committee of Jurists for an advisory opinion which it undertook, in
advance, to accept.14" It was only on September 26, 1927 that the League
Assembly voted to set up an administrative tribunal 50 The Tribunal was
first established on a trial basis.1 51 The International Institute of Agricul-
ture, predecessor of the FAO, set up an ad hoc administrative tribunal on
October 17, 1932 which apparently never rendered any decisions.8 2 The
League Tribunal was established September 26, 192758 and from 1929 to
1946, it held eight sessions and pronounced judgment in thirty-seven
cases. The League of Nations, upon liquidating itself, transferred the tri-
bunal in 1946, where it was reconstituted under the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).'" The reconstituted administrative tribunal exists to
this day as the International Labor Organisation Administrative Tribunal
(ILOAT)155
Other international organizations may recognize the jurisdiction of
ILOAT, subject to approval by the Governing Body of the ILO. To date
145. Newton v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 240 (May 15,
1979).
146. Id. at 8.
147. Assembly Resolution of December 17, 1920, Acts of the First Assembly, Plenary
Sessions 663-64. See also P. GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN, DE L'UTILITRE D'UNE JURIDICTION SP9CIALE
POUR LES R9GLEMENT DES LITIGES INT9RESSANT LES SERVICES DE LA S.D.H. coMPAPAE 67, 1921
REVUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL ET DE LAGISLATION.
148. Mono_ v. LeaTue of Natinns. League of Nations Case No. 1 (1925).
149. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1441-47 (1925).
150. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 751-56 (1928).
151. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 93, at 152 (1927).
152. See S. Bastid, note 1 supra; P. SIRAUD, LE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DE LA SOCIt*
DES NATIONS (1942).
153. See Statute of the League of Nations Admin. Trib. (Sept. 26, 1927), reprinted in
H. AUFRICHT, GUIDE To LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS 485 (1966).
154. LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 194 at 281.
155. Minutes of the 29th Session of the International Labor Conference 341-43 (Oct.
1946); Minutes of the 30th Session of the International Labor Conference 413 (July 11,
1947).
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twenty organizations have done so: (in chronological order) World Health
Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO), International Telecommunications Union
(ITU), World Meterological Organization (WMO), Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), European Council for Nuclear
Research (CERN), ICITO-GATT, IAEA, World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO), EUROCONTROL, Universal Postal Union (UPU),
IIB, European Southern Observatory (ESO), CIPEC, EFTA, Inter-Parlia-
mentary Union, European Molecular Biology Laboratory, World Tourism
Organization (WTO), CAFRAD and Central Office for International Rail-
way Transport (OCTI). 1" ILOAT may, by virtue of article II of its Stat-
ute, be called upon to act as a panel of arbitrators for ILO originated
cases.1 5 7 It has also heard a claim by a WHO official in similar circum-
stances even though article II only speaks of arbitration clauses entered
into by the ILO. "
The Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended
the creation of an administrative tribunal in 1945. The United States and
the Soviet Union in particular, however, regarded its creation as pointless
and an unwarranted interference with the Secretary-General's control
over the Secretariat, and the establishment of the Tribunal was delayed
until November 24, 1949.159 The tribunal has jurisdiction over the UN,
including inter alia, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNDP, and over
two specialized agencies, ICAO and IMCO. It also hears disputes arising
out of the Regulations of the Joint Pension Fund from participants em-
ployed by international organizations participating in the Fund.'10
The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) set
up an Appeals Board in 1950, which evolved into the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Appeals Board. As in
the case of the NATO, Council of Europe and European Space Agency
Appeals Boards, it is, despite its name, a genuine administrative tribunal.
The European Economic Community (EEC) Court of Justice, through
Article 179 of the EEC Treaty and Article 152 of the Euratom treaty, and
156. See J. BALLALOUD, LE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIF DE L'ORGANISATION DU TRAVAIL ET
SA JURISPRUDENCE (1967); Letourneur, La Jurisprudence du Tribunal Administratif de
l'O.I.T., in M9LANGES COUZINET 449 (1974); Letourneur, Le Tribunal Administratif de
l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, in I MALANGES WALINE 203 (1974); Wolf, Le Tri-
bunal Administratif de l'O.I.T., in ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 331 (1954);
Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de L'O.I.T., in R.G.D.I.P. 279 (1954).
157. See Waghorn, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 28.
158. See Rebeck v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 77 (May 11, 1964).
159. G.A. Res. 351 (IV), reprinted in D. DJONOVICH, 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS
329 (1973).
160. See H. WRIGGINS & E.A. BOCK, THE STATUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT:.
ROLE OF THE ADMINSTRATIV TRIBUNAL (1964); Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs In-
ternationaux et Leur Jurisprudence, 92 RECUEIL DES CouRs 347 (1957); Bastid, Le Tribu-
nal Administratif de Nations Unies, in ETUDES ET DOCUMENTS DU CONSEIL D'ETAT 15 (1969);
Friedman & Fatourous, The United Nations Administrative Tribunal, XI INT'L ORG.
(1957).
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through an interpretation of Article 43 of the ECSC treaty, has jurisdic-
tion over disputes between the Communities and their officials.' 6" There
have been administrative tribunals at the Organization of American
States (OAS) since 1971, and at the Institute for the Unification of Pri-
vate Law (Unidroit) since 1952. A Joint Appeals Board was created in
1956 at the Western European Union, and there exist appeals boards also
at the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the In-
ternational Institute for the Management of Technology. (Disputes be-
tween the International Court of Justice and its staff are, according to its
Staff Regulations, settled in a manner to be decided by the Court.) The
Inter-American Development Bank recently created its own administra-
tive tribunal.
The preoccupation of the drafters of the Statute of the League of
Nations Administrative Tribunal, predecessor of ILOAT, was to define
that Tribunal's jurisdiction in such terms that any interference with the
League's administrative discretionary authority would constitute a trans-
gression of jurisdiction by that Tribunal. 62 The same approach had been
adopted at the time of the establishment of UNAT. Thus, when the Gen-
eral Assembly was considering the establishment of the UNAT at its 4th
session in 1949, the United States proposed an addition to article 2 of the
draft Statute:
Nothing in this Statute shall be construed in any way as a limitation
on the authority of the General Assembly or of the Secretary-General
acting on instructions of the General Assembly to alter at any time
the rules and regulations of the Organization including, but not lim-
ited to, the authority to reduce salaries, allowances and other benefits
to which staff members may have been entitled.163
This amendment was eventually withdrawn because, on the basis of
the debate it appeared that article 2(1) of the draft Statute was consid-
ered "broad enough to give sufficient scope to the General Assembly, and
to the Secretary-General acting on its behalf, to carry out the necessary
functions of the United Nations, in spite of the fact that such action
might require changes and reductions in the existing benefits granted to
the staff."' 64 This interpretation was reflected in the Fifth Committee's
161. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, art. 179, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force
.lan 1, 1958): Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25,
1957, art. 152, 298 U.N.T.S. 169 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958); Treaty Instituting the
European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, art. 43, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (entered
into force July 23, 1952).
162. See Statement for UNESCO in 1956 I.C.J. 77, 87-94; Art. 11(1) of the Statute of
the League of Nations Tribunal; LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 58, at 250-57
(1927). See Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, 1982 I.C.J. 359-65, paras. 67-79; Wolf, Le Tribunal Administratif de
l'O.I.T., R.G.D.I.P., supra note 156, at 60-61.
163. A/C.5/L.4/Rev. 2, reprinted in G.A.O.R., 4th Sess., 5th Comm., Annexes, a.i. 44, at
165.
164. A/C. 54/S.R., para. 40.
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report to the Plenary Assembly as follows:
(b) That the tribunal would have to respect the authority of the
General Assembly to make such alterations and adjustments in the
staff regulations as circumstances might require. It was understood
that the tribunal would bear in mind the General Assembly's intent
not to allow the creation of any such acquired rights as would frus-
trate measures which the Assembly considered necessary. It was un-
derstood also that the Secretary-General would retain freedom to ad-
just per diem rates as a result, for example, of currency devaluations
or for other valid reasons. No objection was voiced in the Committee
to those interpretations, subject to the representative of Belgium ex-
pressing the view that the text of the statute would be authoritative
and that it would be for the tribunal to make its own
interpretations. 168
This interpretation was declared equally valid and important by the
World Bank management when proposing the establishment of the
WBAT.
Despite being characterized as "international" tribunals by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, administrative tribunals remain courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction."6 The functional limitations placed upon ILOAT and
UNAT are further underscored by the fact that both organizations' stat-
utes provide for a form of appeal, a mechanism for obtaining a binding
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. Indeed, article
XII of the ILOAT statute provides that:
1. In any case in which the Governing Body of the International
Labour Office or the Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund chal-
lenges a decision of the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or consid-
ers that a decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental fault
in the procedure followed, the question of the validity of the decision
given by the Tribunal shall be submitted by the Governing Body, for
an advisory opinion, to the International Court of Justice.
2. The opinion given by the Court shall be binding.
Additionally, the Annex to the Statute of the Administrative Tribu-
nal of the International Labour Organisation, under Article XII states:
[I]n any case in which the Executive Board of an international
organization which has made the declaration specified in Article II,
paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Tribunal challenges a decision of
the Tribunal confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of
the Tribunal is vitiated by a fundamental fault in the procedure fol-
lowed, the question of the validity of the decision given by the Tribu-
165. A/1127, pars 9, reproduced in G.A.O.R., 4th plenary sess.; Annexes, a.i., 44, at 167-
68. See Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. Pleadings 242; see Bastid, Les Tribunaux Administratifs Internation-
aux et Leur Jurisprudence, supra note 160, at 460.
166. See 1973 I.C.J. 66 at 207-08; 1956 I.C.J. 77 at 90; 1954 I.C.J. 47 at 56.
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nal shall be submitted by the Executive Board concerned, for an advi-
sory opinion to the International Court of Justice.1 7
Article II of the UNAT statute provides:
1. If a Member State, the Secretary-General or the person in re-
spect of whom a judgment has been rendered by the Tribunal (includ-
ing any one who has succeeded to that person's rights on his death)
objects to the judgment on the ground that the Tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction or competence or that the Tribunal has failed to exer-
cise jurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law relating
to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, or has commit-
ted a fundamental error in procedure which has occasioned a failure
of justice, such Member State, the Secretary-General or the person
concerned may, within thirty days from the date of the judgment,
make a written application to the Committee established by para-
graph 4 of this article asking the Committee to request an advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the matter.
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under
paragraph 1 of this article, the Committee shall decide whether or not
there is a substantial basis for the application. If the Committee de-
cides that such a basis exists, it shall request an advisory opinion of
the Court, and the Secretary-General shall arrange to transmit to the
Court the views of the person referred to in paragraph 1.
3. If no application is made under paragraph 1 of this article, or if
a decision to request an advisory opinion has not been taken by the
Committee, within the periods prescribed in this article, the judgment
of the Tribunal shall become final. In any case in which a request has
been made for an advisory opinion, the Secretary-General shall either
give effect to the opinion of the Court or request the Tribunal to con-
vene specially in order that it shall confirm its original judgment, or
give a new judgment, in conformity with the opinion of the Court. If
not requested to convene specially the Tribunal shall at its next ses-
sion confirm its judgment or bring it into conformity with the opinion
of the Court.
4. For the purpose of this article, a Committee is established and
authorized under paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter to request
advisory opinions of the Court. The Committee shall be composed of
the Member States the representatives of which have served on the
General Committee of the most recent regular session of the General
Assembly. The Committee shall meet at United Nations Headquarters
and shall establish its own rules.
5. In any case in which award of compensation has been made by
the Tribunal in favour of the person concerned and the Committee
has requested an advisory opinion under paragraph 2 of this article,
the Secretary-General, if satisfied that such person will otherwise be
handicapped in protecting his interests, shall within fifteen days of
the decision to request an advisory opinion make an advance payment
167. See B. DE VUvST, STATUTES AND RULES OF PRoczDuiz OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINIS-
TRATIVE TRIBUNALS (2d. ed. 1981).
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to him of one-third of the total amount of compensation awarded by
the Tribunal less such termination benefits, if any, as have already
been paid. Such advance payment shall be made on condition that,
within thirty days of the action of the Tribunal under paragraph 3 of
this article, such person shall pay back to the United Nations the
money to which he is entitled in accordance with the opinion of the
Court.' 6
The control of the organization's discretionary authority by interna-
tional administrative tribunals is therefore functionally limited. Such lim-
itation results also from the nature of international organizations them-
selves. As Jenks stated:
[T]he problem of the relationship of executive discretion to judicial
control does not at the present stage of development of international
administrative law involve in any significant degree the protection of
the liberty of the subject against an all-powerful executive. It is not a
problem of creating effective bulwarks against the new despotism and
bureaucracy triumphant. Until such time as, and except in such cases
as, international organizations are entrusted with executive powers di-
rectly applicable to private persons and property, the problem is lim-
ited to their relations with persons who have entered the international
public service and assumed the obligations which membership of an
international public service implies.
One of these obligations is that of accepting executive authority
within its proper sphere. While it is proper and important that the
rights which accompany these obligations should be judicially safe-
guarded, it is no less important that the executive authority of the
administration in respect of matters which are essentially an executive
responsibility should remain unimpaired. 6 '
The UNAT in Howrani,1 70 while emphasizing the importance of pro-
cedural safeguards protecting the staff, expressed the essence of this mat-
ter thus:
[T]he United Nations Secretariat is a young organization which, since
its establishment, has been almost continuously confronted with new
problems and programmes demanding a high degree of flexibility and
adaptability in deploying its resources. There are no indications of
prospective change in its operating environment. In those circum-
stances, it is essential that broad powers be vested in the Secretary-
General to adapt the operations of the Secretariat to achieve the goals
of efficient and economic operation, and to meet the requirements im-
posed by the General Assembly with respect to the improvement of
the standards of the Secretariat. The only effective limitation upon
these powers in the present circumstances of the United Nations lies
168. Id.
169. C.W. JENKS, supra note 2, at 99. See also Letourneur, Le Tribunal Administratif
de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, supra note 156, at 208-09. See Dreyfus, Les
Limitations du Pouvoir Discretionaire, in REvuE D DRorr PUBLIC 691 (1974).
170. Howrani, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 4.
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in the regulation of the manner of their exercise. It is also true that
the exercise of broad powers without adequate procedural safeguards
inevitably produces arbitrary limitation upon the exercise of any
power. The maintenance of the authority of the Secretary-General to
deal effectively and decisively with the work and operation of the Sec-
retariat in conditions of flexibility and adaptability depends, in its ex-
ercise, in large measure upon the strict observance of procedural safe-
guards. In a very real sense, the mode must be the measure of the
power.'71
International administrative tribunals have, since the Howrani deci-
sion, been acknowledging the limitations imposed upon their judicial re-
view capabilities. The Tribunal in Reid 17 2 cited approvingly the report of
the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fourth session on
the establishment of the UN Administrative Tribunal17 3 quoting, inter
alia, that the Secretary-General's discretionary authority "could not be
effectively discharged if an independent Administrative Tribunal were
given authority to reconsider the facts in such cases, in the absence of any
reasonable allegation that the terms of an appointment had been violated,
and to reverse the decision of the Secretary-General. 1'7  The Tribunal
then went on asserting the general rule of recognizing the authority of the
Secretary-General as final, while at the same time asserting "its compe-
tence to review such decisions under certain conditions. '17 5
Likewise, in Cardena,'7 6 a case concerning job regrading, the Tribu-
nal considered "the sovereign authority of these legislative organs [the
Administrative Council and the Plenipotentiary Conference] and of the
Secretary-General' '7 7 and stated:
[I]n the absence of any evidence that a particular decision taken in
virtue of such authority was arbitrary or in bad faith, the Tribunal
cannot constitute itself as a body competent to scrutinize the classifi-
cation of officials and thus to assume. a hierarchical authority over the
organization and its executive head.178
Nowakowska 79 concerned transfers and reassignments to another
post. The Tribunal stated that it "may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the Secretary-General in regard of work or conduct or qualifi-
cations of the persons concerned."' 80
171. Id. at 10.
172. Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210.
173. Report of Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly 4th Plenary
Session, U.N. Doc. A/986.
174. Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 at 406-07.
175. Id. at 407.
176. Cardena, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 39.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Nowakowska, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 115.
180. Id.
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In Russell-Cobb'8 ' the Tribunal declared in an abolition-of-post case
that "it is for the Secretary-General, and not for the Tribunal to make
the choice."' 82 Likewise, in De Pojidaeff'8 the Tribunal indicated that it
was not part of its function to indicate views on alleged weaknesses in
internal administrative proceedings and that if a recommendation of the
Appeals Board showed up a weakness in the machinery of the Secretariat
it was for the Secretary-General to deal with the matter.1" The Tribunal
in Ba'85 did nothing more than confirm a line of case law stating the prin-
ciple of non-reviewability of discretionary decisions by expressing the
opinion that "by reason of its very nature [the decision taken at its dis-
cretion by the international authority] . . . is subject to only limited re-
view. ' 86 Additionally, in Lafuma'87 the Appeals Board stated emphati-
cally that its function was "to apply the Statute [of the Appeals Board]
and not to amend it by interpreting it broadly."'88
Administrative tribunals are not to intervene in the exercise of the
organization's discretion in an affirmative, corrective way except under
certain conditions. Ba'"s illustrates a line of ILOAT Judgments which
give an almost identical definition of what triggers administrative tribu-
nals to intervene.19 International administrative tribunals will not inter-
fere with decisions of a discretionary nature taken by international orga-
nizations unless the decisions were taken without authority, violate rules
of form or procedure, were based on an error of fact or of law, failed to
take essential facts into consideration, are tainted with abuse of author-
ity, or if a clearly mistaken conclusion had been drawn from the facts.'"
181. Russell-Cobb v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 55 (Dec.
14, 1954).
182. Id. at 280.
183. DePojidaeff, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 17.
184. Id. at 63.
185. Ba v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268 (Apr.
12, 1976).
186. Id. See Carter, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 46; Reid, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 210.
187. Lafuma v. Secretary-General, Council of Europe Appeals Board Decision No. 7.
(Oct. 13, 1972).
188. Id.
189. Ba, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268.
190. See Vyle v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 462 (May 14, 1981); In re Molina, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 440; In re
Rosescu, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 431 (Dec. 11, 1980); Joshi, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 208; Frank, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 154; Hermann, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 133; Agarwala v. Food and Agriculture Organization, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 121 (Oct. 15, 1968); Glatz-Cavin, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 127; Crapon de Caprona v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 112 (Oct. 18, 1967); Terrain v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O.
Admin. Trib. No. 109 (May 19, 1967); Garcia, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 32 (Sept.
23, 1958); Marsch v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 10 (Aug. 5, 1954); McIntire,
Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13.
191. See also Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210 at 407 ("Failure to accord
due process to the effected staff member before reaching a decision or disciplinary measures
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Invalidation of decisions taken in the exercise of a discretionary power
are, relatively speaking, not frequent, which may reflect on the standards
used by international administrative tribunals in this respect.
The Ba case was a termination action based on only one supervisor's
report which, it is suggested, was biased against Mrs. Ba. 02 In Ballo,"'9
the Director-General of UNESCO refused to extend a contract against
the unanimous advice of Ballo's supervisors, because, during a congress,
he "had seen [Ballo] ... in action."'" In Glatz-Cavin,"9' the reasons for a
revocation of an assignment turned out not to be the genuine motivation
for the revocation, which was effectively caused through actions of a fel-
low staff member with the authorities of the country of assignment. The
Tribunal found in Gausi (No. 1) 196 that the refusal to review complain-
ant's appointment beyond the normal retirement age was not based on
Mr. Gausi's physical or intellectual capacities-or the lack thereof-but
rather on certain, otherwise unproven, suspicions of irregularities."19 The
Tribunal rightly quashed the decision as a disciplinary measure in
disguise.
In Crawford'"8 the Tribunal stated that the motivation of the con-
tested decision "must have consisted only of [the] knowledge that in 1935
[Crawford] had been, for just over a year, a member of the Communist
Party." 9 The Tribunal held thereupon that "a decision based on such
premises is a violation of an inalienable right of staff members and repre-
sents a misuse of power."200
Dicancro20' provides a more recent illustration of the problem on
which Crawford touched. Appellant had, in this case, rather actively run
an "election campaign" against the WHO-PAHO director accusing the
attracts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."); Lindblad v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N.
Admin. Trib. No. 183 (Apr. 23, 1974); Bhattacharyya, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No.
142; Roy, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 123; Yanez, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib.
No. 112.
192. Ba, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 268. Cf. the factual setting in Cooperman,
Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 93 (Sept. 23, 1965).
193. Ballo, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 191.
194. Id.
195. Glatz-Cavin, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No 127.
196. Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.
197. d.
198. Crawford v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 18 (Aug. 21,
1953).
199. Id. at 69.
200. Id. For similar factual circumstances, see McIntire, Judgements I.L.O. Admin.
Trib. No. 13; Leff, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 18 (Apr. 26, 1955); Duberg, Judge-
ments I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 17 (Apr. 26, 1955); Wilcox, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib.
No. 19 (Apr. 26, 1955); Bernstein, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 21 (Oct. 29, 1955);
Pankey, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 23 (Oct. 29, 1955); Van Gelder, Judgements
I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 24 (Oct. 29, 1955); Aubert, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 2.
201. Dicancro v. World Health Organization, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 427
(Dec. 11, 1980).
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latter, inter alia, of mismanagement. Unfortunately for Dr. Dicancro, the
PAGI director was reelected. When the time came up for the renewal of
appellant's appointment, appellant was accused by the director of mis-
conduct, and his appointment was not renewed. Upon review, ILOAT
stated:
[Tihe first of them [the decisions taken by the director], the non-re-
newal, is a decision within the Director's discretion and subject there-
fore only to a limited power of review by the Tribunal. The reason for
it, given in the letter of 8 December, was that the position which he is
said to have taken 'precludes all possibility of the continuation of a
fruitful working relationship between yourself and the management.'
This reason, on the face of it conclusive, is attacked by the complain-
ant on the ground that the decision resulted from personal prejudice
on the part of the Director or from incomplete consideration by him
of the facts. These grounds, which are taken from Staff Rule 130, fall
within the Tribunal's limited power of review and are such, if they are
established, as to authorize and require the Tribunal to quash the
main decision not to renew.102
After a review of the facts, ILOAT concluded that the director had effec-
tively disabled himself from making the decision on the renewal or, for
that matter, on appellant's alleged misconduct:
The tribunal concludes that he had so disabled himself. The rea-
sonable inference to be drawn from his acts is that he strongly re-
sented the fact that the complainant had stood against him in an elec-
tion in which he, the Director, had only quite narrowly escaped
defeat. What was said after the election . . . is evidence that his re-
sentment was revealed at the time and noted. The charge of miscon-
duct is so preposterous and the Director's eagerness, before hearing
the defence to the charge, to use it as a ground for dismissal is so
manifest that resentment is the only explanation. Accordingly the Tri-
bunal cannot view the letter of 16 October as that of a man who would
be able to take a detached view of the conduct of the complainant
whether in relation to a disciplinary charge or to an assessment of his
future usefulness to the Organization. The two decisions in the letter
of 8 December are linked and are both defective as vitiated by
prejudice.208
Garcia204 concerned the refusal of an indeterminate appointment,
and the Tribunal declared the Director-General's right to make a decision
to grant or refuse such appointment "sovereign," ' professed that it
could not seek for or judge his reasons for doing so, but quashed the deci-
sion because of irregularities of procedure which tainted the otherwise
unreviewable decision and made intervention by the Tribunal necessary.
202. Id. at 7.
203. Id. at 12.
204. Garcia, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 32 (Sept. 23, 1958).
205. Id.
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Gale20 6 dealt with erroneous conclusions that were drawn from the docu-
ments of the file, which made an intervention by the Tribunal necessary.
In Ferrechia0 7 the Tribunal took a stern look at the disciplinary sanc-
tions handed out, finding an unacceptable unproportionality between the
faults committed and the disciplinary measures taken.0 8
V. EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Jenks maintains that "improper motive clearly cannot be pre-
sumed"209 in international administrative decisions and, with this state-
ment, seems to leave the burden of proof on the applicant. UNAT or
ILOAT judgments reviewed do not, however, always give a clear or ex-
press answer as to which party carries the burden of proving that a deci-
sion was or was not tainted, entitling an international administrative tri-
bunal to interfere. As Akehurst has stated, there appear to be no strict
rules about onus before international administrative tribunals. 2 0 Still,
one may squarely put it that it is the plaintiff-staff member who has to
prove a decision to be tainted-or he or she has to furnish the Tribunal
with enough indications of taint to the decision to have the Tribunal re-
verse the burden of proof.
The Tribunal declared in Brisson"' that "the Director-General had
acted for any purpose but to serve the Institute's interests. 2 12 Likewise,
in Coutsis2" the Tribunal did not wish to proceed to a review of certain
medical grounds for the decision "merely because of the Applicant's con-
tention that the Medical Director's findings were erroneous and conflict-
ing with the opinions of other doctors. ' '2 2 ' Similarly, in the Mauch (No.
1)21 case, the Tribunal held in response to a discrimination charge that
there was no evidence to establish improper motivation. The Tribunal in
Kaplan'" held that there was no proof of improper motive on which the
Appellant could rely against the organization. However, in Robinson'"
the Tribunal stated that "it will normally not be possible for the staff
member to produce positive evidence that the reason for the non-renewal
of his contract was his Staff Association activities' '2 8 and it expressly re-
206. Gale v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 89 (Oct. 9, 1963).
207. Ferrechio, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. Nos. 203, 207, 210.
208. But see Reid, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 210.
209. C.W. JNs. supra note 2, at 95.
210. M.B. AKEH RST, supra note 17, at 158.
211. Brisson, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 303.
212. Id.
213. Coutsis, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 69.
214. Id. at 418.
215. Mauch, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 54.
216. Kaplan v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 19 (Aug. 21,
1953).
217. Robinson v. Secretary-General, Judgements U.N. Admin. Trib. No. 15 (July 3,
1952).
218. Id. at 50.
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versed the burden of proof. As UNAT did in Robinson, so did ILOAT in
Mclntire.21 9 The case appears in a peculiar-McCarthy era-background.
The appellant in Mclntire could point to clear indications of misuse of
discretionary authority. Mr. McIntire had been promoted to Chief of Sec-
tion nine days before his immediate dismissal for unsatisfactory services.
It was proven that the U.S. State Department had, in the interval, writ-
ten a letter about Mr. McIntire to the organization. The institution re-
fused, however, to disclose its contents, claiming it to be "confidential."
The Tribunal reacted, given the indications received and the refusal to
communicate the contents of the letter, by reversing the burden of proof
because too many indications of a taint to the decision had been brought
forward.2 20 The ILOAT in Sacika"21 had the opportunity to clarify its in-
vestigative powers under its Rules of Procedure. The applicant in this
case had requested the Tribunal to "order an investigation into the cir-
cumstances surrounding my employment with the ILO and those leading
up to my premature departure from the Organization. 222 ILOAT replied:
[U]nder Article II.1 the Tribunal is competent to hear complaints al-
leging non-observance of the terms of appointment of officials of the
International Labour Office, and of such provisions of the staff regula-
tions as are applicable to the case; and if satisfied that the complaint
is well founded to award under Article VIII to the complainant com-
pensation for the injury caused to him. For this purpose the Tribunal
may under Article III of its Rules order such measures of investigation
as it considers desirable. But it will not order an investigation merely
for the sake of ascertaining the facts; the investigation must be in aid
of some relief, such as reinstatement or compensation, which it is
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant."21
Consequently, ILOAT denied Appellant's request.
The ILOAT clarified also, in its Judgment No. 440, Molina, some
aspects of its judgmental powers in regard of the production of docu-
ments by the international organization, the review thereof by the Tribu-
nal and their communication to Applicant. In Molina," some time after
Applicant's contract was not extended, the Director-General ordered an
inquiry into staff-management relations in the ISP. The complainant
asked that his counsel should be given a copy of the report of the inquiry
and any decisions based thereon. The Organization objected on the
grounds that such evidence is immaterial."25 The Tribunal's decision
states as follows:
219. McIntire, Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 13.
220. See the facts in Al-Abed v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 195, and
see Gausi (No. 1), Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 223.
221. Sacika v. I.L.O., Judgements I.L.O. Admin. Trib. No. 436 (Dec. 11, 1980).
222. Id. at 6.
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On April 2, 1980 ILOAT asked the ILO to supply the report on
the inquiry. The Tribunal examined the report, found it to be confi-
dential, and on 25 April decided not to communicate it to the com-
plainant, at least at that stage. The Tribunal now finally confirms its
decision for the following reasons.
The Tribunal finds that to a large extent and with regard to the
essential issues the report of the inquiry confirms the Obudsman's re-
port which is included in the dossier and which levels serious charges
against the complainant's first-level supervisor. It is therefore unnec-
essary to add to the dossier the report on the inquiry, drawn up at a
later stage. In accordance with a general principle, the findings in re-
ports of this nature should not be disclosed and, unless they are nec-
essary to judicial redress, the Tribunal abstains from ordering the pro-
duction of them. "
VI. CONCLUSION
International administrative tribunals define the relationship in law
between international organizations and their staffs in respect of matters
properly referred to them. Having done so, the international administra-
tive tribunals have fulfilled their task. They have no authority to deal
with the implementation of their decisions, which do not form part of
their judicial functions.2 2 7
It is clear from the above review of the record of certain international
administrative tribunals' decisions that, due to the nature and functions
of international organizations, such organizations enjoy large discretion-
ary powers with respect to treatment of their staffs, so as to enable them
to respond most flexibly to the changing needs of their functional setup
and the calls for action made upon the institutions by their constituent
powers. The international administrative judiciary, while not allowing the
use of discretionary authority for a devious purpose or in an unreasonable
fashion, is rightfully hesitant to actively substitute its decision-making for
that of the international organization. To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter,
it has instinctively and by training been admirably reluctant to cross the
line between adjudication and legislation.2 8
226. Id. at 7, 8.
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